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Volume 17 Summer 2000 Number 2
SIXTH ANNUAL LLOYD K. GARRISON
LECTURE ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
The Future of Environmental
"Rule of Law" Litigation
A. DAN TARLOCK*
I. Introduction: Environmental Law as Litigation
What is environmental law? There is no easy answer to this
simple but complex question. The most common answer is that
environmental law consists of the regulatory programs that have
been enacted by Congress and the states since 1969 and the cases
interpreting those statutes and regulations. A slightly more ex-
pansive answer includes post-New Deal administrative law of in-
creased citizen access to the courts and heightened judicial
scrutiny of resource allocation decisions, and common law tort
remedies for pollution damage. Put differently, environmental law
could be defined as the law found in the standard law school
* Distinguished Professor of Law, Chicago-Kent College of Law. A.B. 1962,
LL.B. 1965, Stanford University. This article is an expanded version of the 2000 Lloyd
Garrison Lecture delivered at Pace University School of Law in White Plains, New
York on March 14, 2000. I would like to thank Professors David Sive, Nicholas Robin-
son, Robert Goldstein and Ann Powers as well as Dean David Cohen for their gracious
hospitality during my visit to White Plains. An earlier version of this paper was
presented at Professor Hope Babcock's seminar on environmental law at the Ge-
orgetown University Law Center on October 30, 1999. I would like to thank Professor
Babcock, Michael Bean, Environmental Defense, Brian Shipley, Georgetown Univer-
sity School of Law, Class of 2000, and the students in her seminar for their challeng-
ing questions and helpful comments. My ever-insightful colleague Fred Bosselman
read the paper as did Professor J.B. Ruhl of Florida State University. I am grateful to
them for their insightful comments.
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casebooks. 1 These are correct, but ultimately unsatisfactory, an-
swers because the mass of statutes, administrative regulations,
guidances and judicial decisions do not constitute a coherent and
distinctive legal category and do not provide much insight into a
more interesting and important question: what is the future of en-
vironmental law? Thirty years after "environmental protection"
emerged as a priority public policy objective, the normative con-
tent of environmental law remains incoherent and contested. 2 In
fact, in addition to incoherence, the most distinctive features of
environmental law are irony and paradox. Thus, a more meaning-
ful question to pose might be, what is the jurisprudential basis of
environmental law, and can this basis sustain itself in the future?
Jurisprudentially, environmental law could be defined as the
positive and common law that reflects environmentalism. En-
vironmentalism is an unstable wedding of two policy objectives:
(1) the protection of public health from the risks associated with
involuntary exposures to pollutants and contaminants, and (2) the
protection and preservation of natural areas. Not surprisingly, a
more complete definition of environmentalism creates a more com-
plex question with many different and contradictory answers. 3
Following Aldo Leopold, 4 I define environmentalism as an emerg-
ing philosophy or value system5 which posits that we living
humans should assume science-based ethical stewardship obliga-
1. E.g., FREDERICK ANDERSON ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: LAW AND
POLICY (3d ed. 1999); JOHN E. BONINE and THOMAS 0. McGARITY, THE LAW OF ENVI-
RONMENTAL PROTECTION (1992); ROGER FINDLEY and DANIEL FARBER, ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW (4th ed. 1995); ROBERT PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION (2d ed.
1996); ZYGMUNT J.B. PLATER et al., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY: NATURE, LAW,
AND SOCIETY (1998).
2. See, e.g., Zygmunt J.B. Plater, Environmental Law and Three Economies:
Navigating A Sprawling Field of Study, Practice, and Societal Governance Where Eve-
rything is Connected to Everything Else, 23 HARv. ENVTL. L. REV. 359 (1999).
3. The best introduction to environmentalism remains T.O. RIORDAN, ENVIRON-
MENTALISM (2d ed. 1980).
4. The main principle of environmentalism is Aldo Leopold's famous dictum that
"[a] thing is right when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of the
biotic community. It is wrong when it tends otherwise." ALDO LEOPOLD, A SAND
COUNTY ALMANAC AND SKETCHES HERE AND THERE 224-225 (1949).
5. The case that a fundamental value or paradigm shift has occurred is set out in
Gilbert F. White, Reflections on Changing Perceptions of the Earth, 1994 Annual Re-
view of Energy and the Environment 19 (1994); and Lester Milbrath, The World is
Relearning Its Story about How the World Works, in Environmental Politics in the
International Arena 21 (Sheldon Kamieniecki ed. 1993). See generally I.G. Simmons,
ENVIRONMENTAL HISTORY: A CONCISE INTRODUCTION (1993).
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tions6 to conserve natural systems for ourselves as well as for fu-
ture generations.7 Every word of this definition can be parsed and
contested, but it is a sufficient working principle because it distin-
guishes environmentalism from the dominant western world view
that the earth is ours to exploit and to enjoy without restraint.8
Environmental law can therefore be explained as an effort to insti-
tutionalize stewardship obligations. For example, emerging inter-
national doctrines, such as the duty of environmental impact
assessment 9 and the use of the precautionary principle to prevent
environmental degradation before conclusive evidence of injury,
exist.10
Defining environmental law as institutionalized stewardship
has the virtue of moving beyond the extreme positive explanation,
but the definition has two major drawbacks. First, although the
definition can be found in statutes and an occasional case,11 it is
6. This proposition is derived from Edward Wilson's dictum that "[flor what, in
the final analysis, is morality but the command of conscience seasoned by a rational
examination of the consequences." EDWARD 0. WILSON, THE DIVERSITY OF LIFE 351
(1992).
7. This defmition is formally neutral on the question of whether it is possible to
create duties toward non-human communities and future generations. Professor
Edith Brown Weiss is the leading exponent of the idea that each generation owes
conservation duties to the generations to come. EDITH BROWN WEISS, IN FAIRNESS TO
FUTURE GENERATION: INTERNATIONAL LAW, COMMON PATRIMONY, AND INTERGENERA-
TIONAL EQUITY (1989). Jeffrey Gaba, Environmental Ethics and Our Moral Relation-
ship to Future Generations: Future Rights and Present Value, 24 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L.
249 (1999), cogently criticizes the idea that our moral relationship to the future can be
expressed in terms of duty or obligation and argues that we should instead focus on
our obligations to ourselves through the lens of virtue ethics. The virtue of benevo-
lence would lead us to make decisions based on the quality of life that "we wish to see
lived in the future." Id. at 286. Neither theory of intergenerational equity, however,
adequately addresses the issue, which is at the heart of more international environ-
mental policy, whether a principle that requires any subordination of immediate de-
velopment on the part of developing nations is fair and thus ethical.
8. The classic exploration of the western tradition from the ancient Hebrews
through the Enlightenment is JOHN PASSMORE, MAN'S RESPONSIBILITY FOR NATURE:
ECOLOGICAL PROBLEMS AND WESTERN TRADITIONS (1974).
9. The duty to prepare an EIS has been so widely adopted throughout the world,
Directive on Environmental Assessment (87/337/EC) and Rio Declaration on Environ-
ment and Development, Principle 17, adopted by the United Nations Conference on
Environment and Development, June 14, 1992, that it can now be said to be a custom-
ary procedural duty. Justice Weermantry posited such a duty in his separate opinion
in Case Concerning the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia) (visited
Sept. 1997) <http://www.ijc.org>.
10. The precautionary principle is still a contested one. Compare PHILIPPE SANDS,
PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 212-213 (1995), with PATRICIA W.
BIRNIE AND ALAN E. BOYLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE ENVIRONMENT 98 (1992).
11. Application of Christensen, 417 N.W.2d 607 (Minn. 1988); Department of
Community Affairs v. Moorman, 644 So.2d 930, 932 (Fla. 1995)("[tlhe clear policy un-
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not a good explanation of how the law surrounding environmental
protection actually functions. From a legal perspective, environ-
mental stewardship remains more a statement of aspiration
rather than a positive description of law because, as a substantive
matter, environmentalism is such a radical break with the west-
ern philosophical and legal tradition 12 that stewardship does not
reflect our actual behavior. We may weep for burned rain forests
in Brazil and enthusiastically support wolf-reintroduction in the
northern Rockies, but we continue to drive too many vehicles too
often and demand more elaborate packaging for our favorite prod-
ucts. Second, much of environmental law has evolved as judge-
made law, and remains more procedural than substantive. There-
fore, this article asks a different question from the over-arching
question of "what is environmental law." Instead, the article asks
what the jurisprudential theory of law is that underlies environ-
mental litigation. This is a more fruitful line of inquiry because it
derlying Florida's environmental regulation is that our society is to be the steward of
the natural world, not its unreasoning overlord." ).
12. One of the many problems with formulating a coherent theory of environmen-
tal "law" is that environmental regulation cuts against the grain of western civiliza-
tion. Thus, environmental law is, to a greater extent than other areas of law, a
product of external forces, difficult to integrate into our legal system, and limited to
the extent that it seeks to impose rather than reflect fundamental societal values. The
thrust of environmentalism is not the enhancement of human dignity but need for
humankind to subordinate itself to two communities, neither of which have legal per-
sonality: future generations and ecosystems. See A. Dan Tarlock, Environmental
Law, But Not Environmental Protection in NATURAL REsouRcEs POLICY AND LAW:
TRENDS AND DIRECTIONS 162-169 (Lawrence J. MacDonnell and Sarah F. Bates eds.
1993); and Joseph L. Sax, The Search for Environmental Rights, 1 J. LAND USE and
ENVIRONMENTAL LAw 93 (1990). The problem of incorporating non-human values into
the calculus of recognized legal interests is illustrated by the difficulty that courts
have had with nuisance claims that are limited to ecosystem damage. At the start of
the environmental movement, a Minnesota trial judge found that the discharge of
taconite tailings into Lake Superior did not constitute a nuisance because they only
increased the "green water phenomenon" and killed a small shellfish that supported
smelt and trout. Reserve Mining v. Minnesota, 2 ERC 1135 (1971). The same result
was reached in Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning
Agency, 34 F.Supp. 1126 (D. Nev. 1999). The Council was ordered to pay damages for
a temporary taking for a moratorium which prohibited building on high hazard lands
around Lake Tahoe. The regional planning agency argued that the moratorium was
necessary to protect Lake Tahoe from gradual degradation from erosion and thus
merely prevent plaintiffs from maintaining a nuisance. However, the court concluded
that "[iut is certainly true that Lake Tahoe is faced with serious harm, which ought to
be prevented if at all possible, but it is not the type of harm contemplated by Califor-
nia nuisance law . . . The fact that the lake may turn green and opaque and be re-
duced to a pale copy of its current self, is abhorrent to think of - yet not, unfortunately
a nuisance as defined by the pre-existing law of California." 34 F.Supp. at 1226. Su-
san Warren, Recycler's Nightmare: Beer in Plastic, WALL ST. J., Nov. 16, 1999, at B1.
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol17/iss2/1
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both probes the immediate origins of the distinctive features of
environmental law in the United States, such as litigation, and
the factors that have influenced its development. It also raises
important questions about the future role of environmental litiga-
tion in the continued evolution of effective environmental
protection.
II. The Argument: The Rule of Law Litigation Strategy
In the 1960's, lawyers had to create the subject of environ-
mental law from whole cloth and, as a result, lawyers followed the
great common law tradition of marginal groups and pursued a
"rule of law" litigation strategy. To discipline public agencies,
through what we now call "public interest" litigation, they had to
convince courts that environmental law in fact existed when it did
not exist. Lawyers had to create the fiction that the recognition of
new environmental protection duties merely required courts to
perform their traditional and constitutionally legitimate function
of enforcing, rather than creating, pre-existing rules. This strat-
egy was adopted out of necessity in an ad hoc fashion because en-
vironmental values had almost no support in the common law, in
constitutional law or in legislation. Access to the courts was lim-
ited because standing was thought to be confined to common law
rights, statutory rights or the clear legislative creation of non-
common law legal interests.
The statutory regimes, which promoted the degradation that
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and their lawyers were
trying to reverse, were all enacted before environmental values
were widely understood. These statutes conferred almost unlim-
ited discretion upon administrative agencies to choose among a
wide range of resource-use options from complete preservation to
full development. Thus, NGO lawyers had to find indirect ways to
convince judges to reach environmental results. This was done by
strictly construing statutes to argue that the agency failed to fol-
low the letter of the statute, or by reading statutes creatively to
find duties in broad delegations of discretion. At times, a strict
statutory reading was fiction to disguise the radical nature of the
legal argument while in other cases, lawyers resorted to orginalist
theories of statutory interpretation to find environmental protec-
tion duties. Occasionally, agency action was found to be ultra vires
on the merits. 13 In short, all environmental litigation proceeded
13. See infra notes 78 to 81.
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on the premise that judicial intervention was necessary to uphold
the rule of law. 14
Environmental law quickly gained a statutory status in the
1970s, but the "rule of law" strategy was carried over into Na-
tional Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA)15 litigation and
the implementation of all the subsequently-enacted pollution con-
trol and biodiversity conservation statutes. This strategy served
the environmental movement well. It transferred power from the
mission agencies to the court, 16 and created powerful environmen-
tal NGOs which now have a seat at the political table. The many
remands and invalidations secured through this strategy have
created powerful incentives for agencies to comply with the likely
environmental NGO construction of the law at all stages of regula-
tory activities. This development was a classic example of the abil-
ity of well-crafted litigation to stimulate social change and to
redress deep power imbalances.
The question today is whether the "rule of law" strategy can
sustain itself in the future. I argue that the sustainability of this
strategy is open to question for two reasons. First, the strategy
was always a fiction because courts were creating, not "finding,"
law, and all fictions break down over time as the need for them
decreases and they become more transparent. Second, the future
evolution of environmental law suggests that the rule of law liti-
gation strategy will be less effective in the future because environ-
mental protection is evolving as it enters its second generation.' 7
14. The classic articulation of this argument is David Sive, Some Thoughts of an
Environmental Lawyer in the Wilderness of Administrative Law, 70 COLUM. L. REV.
612 (1970). Professor Sive argued that courts must intensify judicial review of deci-
sions that failed to give adequate consideration to environmental values in order to
create "a body of doctrines that will enable its practioners to win cases, to neutralize
the effluent of affluence, and to prevent the asphalt jungle from supplanting the still
green part of our one earth." Id. at 614.
15. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 4321 to 4370(d).
16. In his path-breaking book, DEFENDING THE ENVIRONMENT: A STRATEGY FOR
CITIZEN ACTION, Professor Joseph Sax extolled the virtues of litigation as a chance for
the ordinary citizen to challenge government action and suggested that environmen-
tal management requires "a repudiation of our traditional reliance on professional
bureaucrats." The Garrison Lecture series honors one of the great practioners of the
use of litigation to reflect new social values and to redress deep structural societal
power imbalances and inequities, Lloyd K. Garrison. Professor David Sive taught
this tradition by example to the first generation of environmental lawyers and ably
defended it in the first Garrison Lecture. The Litigation Process in the Development of
Environmental Law, 13 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 1 (1995).
17. DANIEL C. EsTy AND MARIAN R. CHERTOW, THINKING ECOLOGICALLY: AN INTRO-
DUCTION IN THINKING ECOLOGICALLY: THE NEXT GENERATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL POL-
ICY 1 (1997).
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Three primary non-legal changes may be converging which chal-
lenge the future of environmental law as "rule of law" litigation.
First, changes in ecology have undermined the simple faith that
preventing changes in natural systems is a sufficient protection
strategy and, thus, the possibility for general, but hard, substan-
tive environmental protection rules. Second, the search for non-
litigation alternatives, especially stakeholder consensus processes
to resolve environmental disputes, is accelerating. There is grow-
ing support for more democratic, decentralized ecosystem man-
agement regimes i s  to promote biodiversity conservation.
Litigation may play an important but different role in this pro-
cess. Ecosystem management is an experiment which may require
very different legal approaches from the first generation of envi-
ronmental problems. 19
Third, if environmental protection is to succeed as a legiti-
mate, permanent policy, it must evolve from a negative strategy of
simply trying to stop an action that disturbs a mythical natural
baseline to a pervasive, affirmative one which provides incentives
for creative super-legal protection solutions that are sometimes
"extra" legal.20 In addition, these changes are occurring in a post-
Chevron21 world when the judiciary is returning to the private
rights model of litigation and, thus, is increasingly indifferent or
hostile to "rule of law" private attorney general actions.
As stated earlier, environmental law has two distinct but
overlapping branches, public health protection and biodiversity
conservation. Although my argument has more applicability for
resource conservation and management, it can also apply to pollu-
tion enforcement litigation. This is especially true as there is a
close link to biodiversity conservation and where over-enforce-
ment of environmental goals may compromise other objectives,
18. See, e.g., TIMOTHY BEATLEY AND KRISTY MANNING, THE ECOLOGY OF PLACE:
PLANNING FOR ENVIRONMENT, ECONOMY AND COMMUNITY (1997).
19. See Lee P. Breckenridge, Nonprofit Environmental Organizations and the Re-
structuring of Institutions for Ecosystem Management, 25 ECOLOGY L. Q. 692 (1999).
20. See WILLIAM HOLLAND DRURY, JR., CHANCE AND CHANGE: ECOLOGY FOR CON-
SERVATIONISTS 185 (1998), observes that "[olbstructionism is an effective program if
one is small, but unfortunately the environmental establishment has persisted in this
strategy even as the movement has grown beyond its limited beginnings."
21. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,Inc., 487 U.S. 837
(1984), requires that courts defer to reasonable agency constructions of laws "[i]f Con-
gress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill." At best, Chevron reflects the
erroneous view that law and the administrative state are not compatible. Cass Sun-
stein, Judicial Review of Administrative Action in a Conservative Era, 39 ADMIN. L.
REV. 353 (1987).
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such as social justice, with no corresponding environmental pro-
tection gain. All of environmental management and law is adapt-
ing to the evolution of environmentalism.
My argument is both positive and normative, and my thesis is
provocative but not absolute. Some of the reasons that I cite are
the inevitable result of the evolution of environmental law and
others posit that some of the direction represents a needed correc-
tion of our initial regulatory strategies to reflect our understand-
ing of the complex nature of environmental systems and their
management. 22 The thesis is not absolute because the need for
NGO vigilance and litigation will always exist. Unlike some liber-
tarian scholars and judges, I do not question the legitimacy of ei-
ther the administrative state or the idea that principled judicial
law creation by agencies and courts is consistent with the rule of
law. Our opened-textured theory of separation of powers, which
has kept courts open to new theories and suits to check the abuses
of the executive and the legislature, needs to be preserved in the
face of the Supreme Court's current assault on it. Confucianism
teaches that one should dissolve rather than resolve disputes, but
we western lawyers do not subscribe to this aspiration. "Rule of
law" litigation will always remain an important feature of envi-
ronmental law because it is a counter-pressure to the inevitable
swings in legislative and executive enthusiasm for environmental
protection. But environmentalists must recognize that all move-
ments change over time and, if they are to have a lasting impact,
the initial strategies must evolve as the movement evolves.
III. Environmental Law as Rule of Law Litigation
A. Environmental Law as the Product of A Legal Guerilla
Warfare
Environmental law is an unplanned by-product of the unique
politics of environmentalism in the late 1960s and early 1970s.
Environmental law began as a legal guerilla movement led by ad
hoc citizens groups which tapped a growing frustration with de-
velopment and the idea that application of all technology was pro-
gress. 23 The objective was often to stop a local public works project
22. See e.g., J.B. Ruhl, Thinking of Environmental Law as a Complex Adaptive
System: How To Clean Up the Environment by Making a Mess of Environmental Law,
34 Hous. L. REv. 933 (1997). See e.g., American Trucking Associations, Inc. v. EPA,
175 F.3d 1027 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (cert. granted, _ U.S. __ (2000)).
23. Former Secretary of the Interior Stewart Udall describes Victor Yannacone,
the first lawyer to try and stop the use of DDT, as follows: "Yannacone was a brilliant
244 [Vol. 17
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or a federal or state licensed activity that allowed the development
of scenic "natural" areas. 24 Environmental law was born out of the
fight to stop a pump storage project at Storm King Mountain on
the Hudson River in New York State. The successful lawsuit to
remand a Federal Power Commission license became the para-
digm environmental law suit.25 First, an ad hoc citizen group
gained unprecedented standing to represent non-economic, aes-
thetic interests. Second, the plaintiffs convinced the Court of Ap-
peals to read a broad regulatory statute, which at best conferred
discretion on the agency to consider aesthetic values (a then much
contested idea), to impose mandatory duties on an agency to con-
sider environmental values and to justify those decisions not to
protect environmental values. 26 This is the core "rule of law" liti-
gation strategy. Judge Hays' reading of the Federal Power Act of
1920,27 which ironically signaled the demise of the progressive
conservation movement 2s as an environmental statute suggested
that a strict construction of statutes could be erected to allow
judges to "discover" environmental mandates. Third, the major
remedy was not a decision on the merits, but a remand. This cast
environmental law as primarily procedural, and litigation as a
tactic to stall an undesired project by political means rather than
by a final adjudication of a legal issue on the merits. Lawyers
sought to obtain, in Joseph Sax's words, either a legislative or ad-
ministrative remand. 29 This strategy was adopted by the United
tactician, but from the beginning he had no illusions that litigation would produce
resounding victories. His maverick motto was 'Sue the Bastards,' and he envisioned
his lawsuits as show trials to dramatize environmental truths that would ultimately
compel members of the legislative and executive branches of government to act. He
was willing to lose court decisions if his cause prevailed in the court of public opinion."
STEWART UDALL, THE QUIET CRISIS AND THE NEXT GENERATION 224 (1988).
24. In his history of the modern environmental movement, Samuel P. Hays
stresses the grass roots, bottoms up nature of the movement compared to the top
down elite scientific conservation movement. SAMUEL P. HAYS, BEAUTY, HEALTH AND
PERMANENCE: ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1955-1985 (1987).
25. See Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir.
1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (U.S. May 16, 1966) (No. 1159).
26. The plaintiffs were aided by the fact that a decade earlier, the Commission
had successfully defended its authority to deny a license to protect a free-flowing
river, 216 F.2d 509 (7th Cir. 1954). See A. Dan Tarlock, et al., Environmental Regula-
tion of Power Plant Siting: Existing and Proposed Institutions, 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 502,
514-523 (1972).
27. See Federal Power Act § 1 et seq., 16 U.S.C § 791(a) et seq. (1920).
28. See SAMUEL P. HAYS, CONSERVATION AND THE GOSPEL OF EFFICIENCY: THE
PROGRESSIVE CONSERVATION MOVEMENT 1890-1920 (1959).
29. See JOSEPH L. SAx, DEFENDING THE ENVIRONMENT: A STRATEGY FOR CITIZEN
ACTION 175-192 (1971).
9
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States Supreme Court in Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v.
Volpe3 ° which imposed a high burden on the Federal Highway Ad-
ministration to justify the use of park lands for federally funded
highways.
Ad hoc citizen groups are now institutionalized NGOs31 and
the major national groups represent environmental interests in
the legislative process. But the lawsuit to block a federal action or
to invalidate an agency regulation as ultra vires or as inade-
quately explained remains the ultimate trump card of the move-
ment and continues to be wielded with great frequency. In fact,
the regulated community has paid NGOs the highest compliment.
With increasing success, the regulated community has adopted
the movement's litigation strategies. The United States Supreme
Court and lower federal courts are increasingly receptive to per-
verse, "creative" readings of environmental statutes to frustrate
environmental protection. 32
"Rule of law" litigation was initially seen as an interim strat-
egy which would give way as Congress adopted the necessary com-
mand and control regulatory programs and as agencies
internalized the lessons of environmental protection. However,
the need for litigation did not wither away as predicted.3 3 In-
stead, subsequent events in the 1970's and 1980's strengthened
rather than lessened the need for the strategy. Congress saddled
the newly created federal Environmental Protection Agency with
impossible tasks such as balancing health protection with eco-
nomic efficiency, and resolving difficult scientific and technical
questions to promulgate fair, effective, timely and legal regula-
30. 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
31. In recent years, the mainline environmental organizations have been criti-
cized as too powerful, too accommodating to the other interests in the political pro-
cess, and out of touch with local problems.
32. See e.g., Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154 (1997)(Endangered Species Act in-
tended "to avoid needless economic dislocation produced by agency officials zealously
but unintelligently pursuing their environmental objectives.")
33. A similar assumption was made about the role of the common law. Environ-
mentalists anticipated that regulation would be far superior to common law tort ac-
tions because it was comprehensive and preventative. But the common law has
persisted. Common law actions catch pollution not controlled by regulatory schemes,
e.g. Tiegs v. Watts, 135 Wn.2d 1 (1998). In the 1980's, the common law as a general
redress and deterrence strategy was revived as a law of "toxic torts." However,
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), undermines the
ability of common law actions to perform these fumctions because it requires mechan-
istic, and difficult to establish, proof of cause-in-fact to support a civil action for the
recovery of damages from alleged injuries resulting from exposure to many types of
toxic agents.
246 [Vol. 17
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tions.34 "Rule of law" litigation was an effective way to keep EPA's
feet to the fire and to pressure them to err on the side of environ-
mental protection. Politics also kept the strategy alive. In 1981,
the Reagan administration took office determined to roll back en-
vironmental regulation. Congress did not comply and, instead, the
EPA and the federal land management agencies tried to reinter-
pret the strong protection mandates adopted in the 1970s to
lessen protection duties. "Rule of law" litigation proved to be quite
effective in stopping administrative "lawlessness.35
B. The Rule of Law and Environmental Law
The idea of the rule of law is the glory of the western legal
tradition, 36 although it remains a highly contested principle37 es-
pecially as modern legal thinkers have either politicized the prin-
ciple or questioned its viability. Fortunately, the idea is more
powerful than its critics as it comes to remind us that state power
must be cabined. The rule of law debate is rooted in Aristotle's
dictum that the rule of law is preferable to the rule of men.38 A. V.
Dicey reiterated the dictum and identified it as one of the distinc-
tive features of English constitutionalism. 39 Rule of law is regu-
34. The literature on the EPA's problems includes James A. Henderson, Jr. and
Richard N. Pearson, Implementing Federal Environmental Policies: The Limits of As-
piration Commands, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 1429 (1978); Bradley Bogarz, Legitimizing
Pollution Through Control Laws: Reflections on Scapegoating Theory, 73 TEx. L. REV.
711 (1995); John Dwyer, The Pathology of Symbolic Legislation, 17 ECOLOGY L.Q. 233
(1990); Richard Lazarus, The Tragedy of Distrust in the Implementation of Federal
Environmental Law, 54 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 311 (1991).
35. See e.g., Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Hodel, 618 F.Supp. 848
(E.D. Cal. 1985)(United States Department of Interior's (DOI) regulations which dele-
gated the authority to set grazing allotments to selected ranchers contrary to both
Taylor Grazing Act and Federal Land Policy Management Act which required the
DOI to specify livestock numbers and seasons in each Taylor Grazing Act grazing
permit to balance livestock range use with the restoration and conservation of this
fragile resource.).
36. HAROLD J. BERMAN, THE NATURE OF LAW AND ITS FUNCTIONS 7 (1958).
37. See THE RULE OF LAW, (Ian Shapiro ed. 1994). [Hereinafter cited as THE RULE
OF LAw] and Margaret Jane Radin, Reconsidering the Rule of Law, 69 B.U. L. REV.
781 (1989). See also Richard H. Fallon, Jr., "The Rule of Law" as a Concept of Consti-
tutional Discourse, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1997) and ROBERT P. BURNS, A THEORY OF
THE TRIAL 10-33 (1999)(standard view of trial as consistent with the rule of law
wrong).
38. Personal rule "should be sovereign only in those matters on which law is una-
ble, owing to the difficulty of framing general rules for all contingencies, to make ex-
act pronouncements." THE POLITICS OF ARISTOTLE, Book 3, ch. 11, sec. 19 (Baker
Trans. 1946).
39. See A. V. DICEY, THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION (10th ed. 1959). Dicey bor-
rowed the idea, with acknowledgment, from an earlier writer but it was Dicey who
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larly invoked to justify a particular conception of law and there
are many formulations of it, but they generally share four common
characteristics. First, state power must be exercised through pre-
viously announced rules of general applicability. Second, the rules
must be justified by legal rather than extra-legal reasons. Power
may not be exercised through ad hoc individual decisions
grounded in personal will. Montesquieu's contrast between Euro-
pean, primarily British, and Ottoman law and administration has
been the defining idea of law as a restraint on naked power. Third,
rules must bind all members of government. The idea that no per-
son is above the law is the basis of United States v. Nixon4° which
required the President to turn over the Watergate tapes to a spe-
cial prosecutor. There, the Court rejected the claim of executive
privilege as inconsistent "with our historic commitment to the rule
of law."41 Fourth, the laws must be administered by an indepen-
dent and impartial judiciary.
The mix of these elements varies from legal system to legal
system but there is more convergence than divergence. For exam-
ple, the civil code is the basis of the rule of law in the continental
system and the judge theoretically plays a secondary role. In con-
trast, the common law venerates the judge. 42 In many ways, the
most powerful theory of the rule of law is the product of the
unique American experience. We took Lockian and Montes-
quieuian theories of separation of powers and blended them with
the Cokian tradition of the law declaring judge as hero. Despite
formalist theories of legislative and executive supremacy,
grounded in popular sovereignty, we have a long tradition of
equating judges as better representatives of popular will com-
pared to the legislative and the executive counterparts. 43
The question still persists: can the rule of law be applied to
environmental protection? This is an extremely hard question be-
cause environmental protection does not necessarily fit within the
rule of law paradigm. The grand objectives of environmental law
made the concept central to Anglo-American law. RICHARD A. COSGROVE, THE RULE OF
LAW: ALBERT VEEN DICEY: VICTORIAN JuRIsT 67-75 (1980).
40. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
41. Id. at 708.
42. See BENJAMIN CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF tHE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1922).
43. My colleague David Gerber brilliantly elucidates the distinctive feature of the
common law in his forthcoming book, THE SPIRIT OF COMMON LAw. In recent times,
the historian Gordon Wood has powerfully articulated and documented the origins of
this idea. See, e.g., The Origins of Vested Rights in the Early Republic, 85 VA. L. REV.
1421 (1999).
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are only partially related to the protection of human dignity and
property. Environmental law is both anthropocentric and non-an-
thropocentric; it seeks to protect society from future risks of seri-
ous health problems, such as cancer, genetic mutation and disease
epidemics, and the irreversible impairment of ecosystem services.
However, the actual human benefits of environmental protection
are hard to demonstrate and much protection is implemented on
the belief that nature should be protected for intrinsic reasons.
Thus, much of environmental law remains a very contested, radi-
cal idea which sits outside of the western constitutional and com-
mon law tradition.44 Instead of drawing on past, widely accepted
societal norms such as fairness and due process, it depends on
new ethical principles. There is relatively little past law to apply
except the common law of nuisance. For example, environmental
law is the only modern area of law that has flourished in the face
of Supreme Court indifference or blatant hostility.45 Nonetheless,
the rule of law both describes and justifies judicial environmental
protection. In American jurisprudence, the central question in the
44. The western legal tradition identifies "constitutionalism" as the fundamental
legal basis for organizing society. The basic norm of western constitiutionalism is the
recognition of negative liberties against the government. Government action is always
measured against two standards: (1) consistency with delegated authority and (2) the
non-infringement of fundamental individual rights. Law is also primarily negative: it
gives back what was taken away. It is also a regime which treats all persons equally,
recognizes and protects their fundamental rights, and does so by the application of
clear standards in a consistent and fair manner against both other private parties and
the state. The Constitution, for example, is not a source of environmental rights and
duties because the values that environmentalism promotes are not primarily those of
the Enlightenment. The Constitution is frequently defined as a negative charter of
liberties, but environmental protection requires the affirmative exercise of regulatory
power. Expert consensus maintains that constitutions should be confined to negative
rather than affirmative rights. See Richard J. Posner, The Costs of Rights: Implica-
tions for Central and Eastern Europe and for the United States, 32 TULSA L. REV. 1
(1996); J.B. Ruhl, The Metrics of Constitutional Amendments: And Why Proposed En-
vironmental Quality Amendments Don't Measure Up, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 46
(1999). The efforts of an indigenous group in Indonesia to seek redress for the cultural
and environmental degradation caused by mining is instructive. The group's Alien
Tort Act claims were dismissed because the Act only applies to shockingly egregious
violations of international law that have been generally recognized. The sources cited
by plaintiff were dismissed as "merely ... a general sense of environmental responsi-
bility ... [which] state abstract rights and liberties devoid of articulable or discern-
able standards and regulations to identify practices that constitute international
environmental abuses or torts." Principle 2 of The Rio Declaration was not applicable
because it (1) confirms state sovereignty over natural resources, and (2) only prohibits
acts which injure another nation. See Beanal v. Freeport-Moran, Inc., 969 F.Supp.
362 (E.D. La. 1997), affd, 1999 U.S. App. Lexis 31365 (11th Cir. 1999).
45. See Richard Lazarus, Restoring What's Environmental About Environmental
Law In The Supreme Court, 47 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 703 (2000).
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rule of law debate, as it has always been, is the role of judges in
making law. Rule of law litigation was particularly well suited to
the creation of environmental law because the debate about the
role of judges implies that lawmaking by constitutionally gov-
erned officers is more legitimate than lawmaking by nonconstitu-
tionally governed administrative agencies. Environmental law as
practiced is primarily a substantive subset of administrative law
and litigation fits within the long tradition of using the courts to
check the arbitrary exercise of power by the executive.
This said, rule of law litigation's formal fit is largely illusion-
ary because the purpose of litigation was to transfer political
power from legislatures, the executive and the administrative
agencies to the courts. Ironically, the most politically conservative
theory of the concept best describes the formal jurisprudential ex-
planation for environmental litigation, but it does so by disguising
its ultimate purpose. The current formalist theory of the rule of
law is epitomized by Mr. Justice Antonin Scalia's attempt to en-
graft the German Rechtsstaat onto the American experience. His
much cited and criticized article, The Rule of Law as A Law of
Rules, 46 articulates fidelity to clear constitutional and settled com-
mon law rules as the core of the rule of law. Ronald Dworkin's
argument that the principal function of the rule of law is to protect
and expand individual rights and liberties is the opposite, modern
liberal political theory. This theory47 could be adapted to justify
"rule of law" litigation as the extension of political and civil rights
to non-human communities, but it does not in fact describe the
jurisprudence of environmental litigation.
C. The Structure of Rule of Law Litigation: Thinking Unger
But Pleading Hart
"Rule of law" litigation initially was a creative effort to create
a new law out of whole cloth without disclosing the truly radical
nature of the project in the great tradition of disguised common
46. 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175 (1989).
47. See RODERICK N. NASH, THE RIGHTS OF NATURE: A HISTORY OF ENVIRONMEN-
TAL ETHICS (1989), argues that environmental rights represent a progressive exten-
sion of dignity, albeit from humans to non-humans. As my colleague, Anita
Bernstein, has noted in the context of judicial tort reform, the most effective creation
of new torts occurs when the proponent appears to be doing nothing more than ratio-
nalizing existing law. See Anita Bernstein, How to Make a Tort: Three Paradoxes, 75
TEX. L. REV. 1539 (1997). Professor Hope Babcock, who was almost present at the
creation, has pointed out that the early NGOs had no such grand strategy in mind.
However, the technique was invoked to uphold the rule of law.
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law reform. To do this, NGO lawyers relied on orthodox theories
of the rule of law, in combination with the judicial activism then in
vogue, to advance environmentalism. Early environmental law
suits generally advanced one of three theories to convince judge to
enjoin environmentally destructive activities. Judges were first
asked to find that an agency acted ultra vires in taking the con-
tested action. The successful suit to end clear cutting through the
national forest system was won on the theory that the 1897 Or-
ganic Act required that the Service mark every "dead, matured or
large growth of trees" in an area as suitable for harvest before it
could be cut.48 The failure to follow a clear legal mandate is still
the most effective type of lawsuit. The second type of suit argued
that an agency had the discretion to act to protect the environ-
ment and failed to exercise the discretion or to justify adequately
the failure to use it. 4 9 The third type of suit alleged the familiar
failure to follow strictly proscribed procedures. Judge J. Skelly
Wright's reading of NEPA in Calvert Cliffs Coordinating Council,
Inc. v. United States Atomic Energy Comm'n 50 institutionalized
this type of law suit.
In jurisprudential terms, lawyers created a new law out of
whole cloth without disclosing the truly radical nature of the pro-
ject. This was accomplished by paradoxically pleading the theo-
ries of H.L.A. Hart to advance the theory of law more closely
associated with the soon-to-emerge critical legal studies move-
ment (CLS). Or, at the very least, the aim was to open judges
minds to the central idea of the Henry Hart and Sacks legal pro-
cess school: that judges could articulate the underlying fundamen-
tal values of the relevant legal regime to resolve disputes.
Environmental law preceded the CLS movement by several years,
and has been relatively uninfluenced by it. Nonetheless, it is an
48. See West Virginia Division of the Izzack Walton League of America v. Butz,
522 F.2d 945 (4th Cir. 1975). See Oliver A. Houck, The Water, the Trees, and the Land:
Three Nearly Forgotten Cases That Changes the American Landscape, 70 TUL. L. REV.
2279 (1996).
49. See e.g., Zabel v. Tabb, 430 F.2d 199 (5th Cir. 1970) (The U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers has authority to deny dredge and fill permits for environmental reasons);
Calvert Cliffs Coordinating Council, Inc. v. United States Atomic Energy Commis-
sion, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971)(The Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) has an
independent duty, reversed by Congress in the Clean Water Act, to consider water
quality impacts of nuclear power plant discharges). Cf Sierra Club v. Marita, 46 F.3d
606 (7th Cir. 1995)(In an unsuccessful argument, the U.S. Forest Service had no duty
to use conservation biology to create biodiversity reserves in a second growth forest in
northern Wisconsin.).
50. 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
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example of a parallel radical legal movement. The partially suc-
cessful project of environmental law is much more concrete and
incremental compared to the social reordering initially envisioned
by the CLS movement. Still, the two movements share a common
vision of law as the reflection of the real distribution of political
power and wealth in the society and, thus, relative and normative
rather than absolute and objective. From the start, the goal of en-
vironmentalism has been to challenge the ability of powerful cor-
porations and their congressional and administrative allies to
cause environmental degradation at will. However, this radical,
Germanic, if not Marxian, theory of law has been muted and kept
beneath of the surface of environmental law.
In contrast to environmental law, the CLS movement re-
sponded to the rediscovery that law could serve political and fi-
nancial elites by deconstructing it and trying to transform it.
Environmental law would be a perfect case for the kind of post-
modern transformative jurisprudence advocated by Roberto Un-
ger and others. 51 It is non-formal, indeterminate law at its best,
more rhetoric than law, and ultimately seeks to destabilize and
redistribute the boundaries of property.5 2 There is, however, a
crucial difference between the two movements. The CLS move-
ment rejected incremental legal change in favor of fundamental
political reform. As environmentalism was perceived as a legiti-
mate and non-radical political goal, environmentalists had the
choice of pursuing both incremental or "liberal" political and legal
reform. Thus, for the most part, environmental lawyers may have
thought Unger but they have litigated H.L.A. Hart, or the
Harvard Hart and Sacks legal process school.
The formal liberal model of environment law presented by
NGO lawyers essentially tracked, probably unconsciously, the the-
ory of law propounded by the leading British scholar of jurispru-
dence in this century, who is, at first blush, an unlikely source of
United States environmental law. Professor H.L.A. Hart was one
of the leading post-World War II exponents of analytical jurispru-
dence derived from the strong positivist tradition in Great Brit-
51. MALCOLM M. FEELEY & EDWARD L. RUBIN, JUDICIAL POLICY MAKING AND THE
MODERN STATE: How COURTS REFORMED AMERICA'S PRISONS 243-244 (1998) argue
that, in post-modern society, the rule of law is achieved through process and the insti-
tutional structure rather than to fidelity to existing text.
52. See ROBERTO MANGABIERA UNGER, WHAT SHOULD LEGAL ANALYSIS BECOME?
152 (1996).
[Vol. 17252
16http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol17/iss2/1
2000] ENVIRONMENTAL "RULE OF LAW" LITIGATION 253
ain.53 His core idea is that law is a set of pre-existing rules that
are relatively narrow and formal with penumbras of uncer-
tainty.5 4 Rules are basically the communication of a preexisting
standard intended to be binding on the relevant parties. He distin-
guished between primary and secondary rules. Primary rules are
commands followed by sanctions. Secondary rules confer the
power to create and interpret both types of rules, but noncompli-
ance results only in the nullification of the power rather than a
sanction. Hart recognized that a complete system of a priori rules
was impossible, if not undesirable, and the judges must always
exercise discretion. His project, however, was to close the gap be-
tween rule and discretion by developing a theory of law as consis-
tent, coherent rules. In his famous formulation, coherence is
achieved by the development of rules of recognition, widely ac-
cepted societal background rules. 55 This theory allowed lawyers
to avoid the central tension between "rule of law" litigation and
the rule of law requirement: that judicial exercises of the state's
coercive power require that they be grounded in law.56
H.L.A. Hart's model was difficult to apply to environmental
law because in 1970 there were no general, widely accepted envi-
ronmental rules of recognition as he would define them. A more
progressive, incremental theory was needed to complement his
53. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (1961). Hart's attempts to state a com-
plete and comprehensive theory of law in the face of the inevitable problem that rules
break down at the edges requires considerable restatement. Frank Hubbard, "One
Man's Theory ..." A Metatheoretical Analysis of H.L.A. Hart's Model of Law, 26
MD.L. REV. 39 (1976).
54. H. L. A. Hart's legal philosophy evolved over time and has been subject to
intense criticism and exegesis. However, the debate about how formalistic Hart's ju-
risprudence is, see MICHAEL MARTIN, THE LEGAL PHILOSOPHY OF H.L.A. HART: A CRIT-
IcAL APPRAISAL 15-67 (1987), or the famous Hart-Dworkin debate about the role of
morals in the exercise of judicial discretion, Ronald Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 35
U. CHI. L. REV. 14 (1967), does not detract from the basic point that the Hart model of
rules describes the strategy of much of environmental liligation. The Hart model fo-
cuses the court on the application of pre-existing rules rather than on more opened-
ended moral justifications for the decision. See JEFFRIE G. MURPHY AND JULES L.
COLEMAN, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW: AN INTRODUCTION TO JURISPRUDENCE 42-60
(1984).
55. H.L.A. Hart's effort to ground law in accepted norms which cannot be ques-
tioned has been justly criticized as incoherent. See George C. Christie, NORMS AND
AUTHORITY 83-86 (1982).
56. Professor Stephen P. Garvey has identified three definitions of the rule of law.
It can mean that judges are constrained in how far they can realistically impose their
vision on society; that judicial rules must meet a predictability standard; or, all judi-
cial exercises of state coercion must be justified by law. (Book Review) Did Making
Over The Prisons Require Making Up Law? 84 CORNELL L. REV. 1476, 1494-1495
(1999).
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formal and static model of rules in cases where no clear legislative
rules existed. The Henry Hart and Sacks Harvard legal process
school provided a complementary theory of environmental litiga-
tion which partially, but not wholly, solved the rule of law prob-
lem. Legal process theory was in vogue just before the
environmental movement, although it went into decline as it was
perceived as the intellectual basis for an attack on Brown v. Board
of Education.5 7 Hart and Sacks developed a theory of adjudication
that involved a constant interplay among four sources of law:
rules, standards, rule like norms, and principles.58 In more mod-
ern terms, law is as much about standards as it is about rules
because it allows for reasoned judicial reform.5 9 This theory legiti-
mated a relatively more open-ended, progressive process of adjudi-
cation which allowed judges to test the validity of preexisting
norms by reinterpreting them in light of contemporary social and
economic conditions, provided that their decisions met the test of
reasoned elaboration. Environmentalism is a changed social con-
dition and environmental law, for those judges who struggled to
understand it, fit the Hart and Sacks model quite well.
IV. The Problem of Rules
A. The Evolution Away from Command and Control Regulation
Environmental law, now a mature area of the law, is undergo-
ing a substantial evolution which calls into question the continued
effectiveness of the "rule of law" litigation strategy. As environ-
mental law enters its fourth decade, there are several new devel-
opments that call into question the continued ability of rule of law
litigation to provide or stimulate effective environmental protec-
tion. The most fundamental and long term challenge comes from
the efforts to supplement command and control regulation and
centralized rational planning which concentrates on the largest
members of the regulated community, i.e., large industries and
57. Virginia E. Nolan and Edmond Ursin, The Deacademification of Tort Theory,
48 KAN. L. REV. 59, 68-70 (1999), elaborate the limited judicial lawmaking contem-
plated by the legal process school.
58. See ANTHONY SEBOK, LEGAL POSITIVISM IN AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 139-146
(1998) is an important rehabilitation of this theory.
59. See Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE
L. REV. 557 (1992); Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme Court, 1991 Term-Forward:
The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARv. L. REV. 22, 57-69 (1992); MARK KEL-
MAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 15-63 (1987); and FREDERICK SCHAUER,
PLAYING By THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED DECISIONMAK-
ING IN LAW AND IN LIFE 104 (1991).
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major public lands users, with experimental, collaborative govern-
ance regimes. This process, if one can call the various ad hoc ef-
forts anything, seeks greater decentralized consensus-based
regulation run by public and private "stakeholders."60 For exam-
ple, we are now seeking to induce industries to exceed standards,
to reduce waste streams and total pollution and to mitigate on-
and off-site environmental damage caused by industrial and com-
modity production activities. 61 This development is complimented
by our increased reliance on market proxies and on the more di-
rect involvement of small entities and the individual consumer in
resource use choices that impact the environment. 62
The fundamental jurisprudential problems for environmental
law that this evolution presents are that few substantive rules, as
H.L.A. Hart would define them, have emerged from environmen-
tal law to date, and that such rules are less likely to be developed
in the future. Although the rules may have come from two similar
sources, ethics and science, they have failed to deliver relatively
clear, uniform rules. Many collaborative governance processes re-
present an effort to institutionalize Leopold's teaching by moving
to a more holistic landscape vision of large natural, semi-natural,
and artificial landscapes which form inter-linked ecosystems to
paradoxically mitigate against the development of rules. This vi-
sion requires ad hoc, place-based solutions to enhance and con-
serve biodiversity, as well as the greater use of economic
instruments such as pollution, wetlands, or biodiversity conserva-
tion trading. Environmental management is not, in the opinion of
most experts, amenable to a simple set of pre-established rules.63
Courts are crucial to the initial development of an area of law but
60. MARK SAGOFF, The View From the Quincy Library: Civil Engagement in Envi-
ronmental Problem Solving, in CIVIL SOCIETY, DEMOCRACY AND CIVIL RENEWAL 151-
183 (Rovert Fullinwider ed., 1999).
61. For a thoughtful articulation of the movement from "that evil polluter" to us
see William Ruckelshaus, Stopping the Pendulum, THE ENVIRONMENTAL FORUM 25
(November/December, 1995) reprinted in LAW AND THE ENVIRONMENT at 397. See gen-
erally Daniel Esty, Optimal Environmental Governance, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1495
(1999).
62. Professor Jody Freeman of UCLA has emerged as a leading theorist of the
post-modern administrative state. See Jody Freeman, The Private Rule in Public
Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2000).
63. But see RICHARD EPSTEIN, SIMPLE RULES FOR A COMPLEX WORLD 275-305
(1995). Professor Epstein virtually begins and ends with nuisance prevention as the
basis for environmental regulation. See Eric W. Orts, Simple Rules and the Perils of
Reductionist Legal Thought (Review of Simple Rules for a Complex World by Richard
A. Epstein), 75 B.U. L. REV. 1441, 1469-1472 (1995), for a cogent discussion of why it
is not always a gift to be simple.
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their influence inevitably decays as legislation, administration
and the more general internalization of legal norms occurs. 64 This
condition is not always conducive to environmental protection, as
the progressive decline of NEPA's influence illustrates. Finally, to
compound the problem, Congress has come up with a much more
effective way to retard environmental protection in the form of the
appropriations rider, which is much less amendable to judicial
control and rule development.
These changes are both the product of the inevitable evolution
of environmentalism and a judicial landscape that has changed,
perhaps degraded, since the late 1960s. Taken together, these de-
velopments challenge two aspects of "rule of law" litigation. First,
the end product of litigation is blurred. Litigation is intended to
reach a final decision and to resolve a dispute. Environmental liti-
gation can either be a decision that is an ultra vires action or it
can be a decision that the process was flawed and must be cor-
rected. Ecosystem experiments make it much more difficult for
courts to find a final action to review. Process violations are eas-
ier to identify and redress, although this technique will be less
useful in the future. Second, successful innovation may require
all parties to forego strict adherence to existing laws. Collabora-
tive governance is basically the use of stakeholder groups to
achieve consensus on a specific resource management plan or a
specific mixed public-private regulatory scheme. This collabora-
tion helps to achieve a result that is either superior to, or more
politically acceptable than, existing legal mandates and entitle-
ments against those whose actions threaten the achievement of
environmental quality. Consensus inevitably involves compro-
mise; all parties must agree to forebear while claiming some po-
tential legal advantage.6 5 Successful collaborative governance
often requires that stakeholders transcend the rule of law to reach
a solution that shares risk over a long period of time and achieves
better results than those produced by strict adherence to legal
entitlements.
64. Cf. H. Marlow Green, Can The Common Law Survive in the Modern Statutory
Environment? 8 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 89, 109 (1998). (Empirical study of de-
cline of state common law environmental tort claims due to displacement by federal
actions which concludes that one could hypothesize that there will soon (perhaps by
the year 2010) be no common law cases at the state level left to report.)
65. Mordechai Schecter, Economy and the Environment: A New Partnership, 21
ISR. ENV'T BULL. 10 (1998), observes that statutes are not written to encourage inno-
vative cooperative solutions and thus there must often be less than full enforcement
and a creative reading to effectuate a solution.
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B. The Problem of Science: Nature Refuses to Cooperate
Changes in the science of ecology will lessen the importance of
"rule of law" litigation. The inability to develop rules derives both
from the newness of the area and the fact that environmental law
is fundamentally science-based. 66 There are no uniform scientific
rules that can be consistently applied to all situations. Nor are
there are uniform rules for ecosystem management or for risk pro-
tection. To complicate matters, the beneficiaries of biodiversity
protection, flora and fauna, can assert no rights to counter the un-
certainties that surround all efforts to manage resources scientifi-
cally. Biodiversity is always something that can be traded off for
other values, and the fairness of the process of protection is as
important as the substantive results. This may be good law but it
is not always good biodiversity protection. The reason is simple:
the protection of biodiversity devalues human dignity because it
violates individual rights, such as property and the right to fair
and consistent treatment by the government. Environmental eth-
ics, to the extent that it seeks to create non-human rights, has
been unable to develop substantive rules that are capable of mak-
ing the choices among competing resource options that environ-
mental protection requires a choice among competing resource
uses. This problem has been with us from the beginning of the
environmental movement and has not been solved. Similarly,
there is no neo-Kantian principle of absolute entitlement from
risk. Risk protection is inherently relative and must be informed
by benefit-cost analysis. In short, environmental protection inevi-
tably requires the exercise of informed, but ad hoc, situation-
based judgment.
Changes in ecology make it more difficult to subject environ-
mental ethics to the rule of science-based laws than environmen-
talists initially assumed. Environmental lawyers have long hoped
that equilibrium ecology as stated in Eugene Odum's classic texts
and reduced to an ur-principle by Leopold's dictum "let nature be"
(as distinguished from the more complex idea of land health or
stewardship) would be the foundation of environmental law. Ecol-
ogy allowed lawyers to use the rule of law litigation strategy to
66. This argument does not deny that there is an ethical component to environ-
mental law, but it does argue that environmentalism must be grounded in the west-
ern rational tradition and that ethics must be supported by science. I have argued
this point at length in A. Dan Tarlock, Environmental Law: Ethics or Science? 7 DuKE
ENvTL. L. & POL'Y F. 193 (1996).
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convince courts to adopt nature's rules as legal rules.67 However,
simple ecology and ethics are not a good basis for the law of
ecosystem management for three primary reasons. First, the idea
of nature as placed apart from humans will not hold in the future.
From a biodiversity conservation perspective, nature is important
for the services she provides. Second, the challenge for the future
will be to restore degraded areas and to create the functional
equivalent of "natural" systems. Many environmentalists resist
the ideas of restoration and creation asserting that there is a firm
distinction between real and artificial nature, and that it is uneth-
ical for humans to attempt to create nature. 68 However, this un-
realistic vision of the landscape in which we live has no future.
The third factor that inhibits rule development is that ecosys-
tem management requires ad hoc, inherently contingent rather
than uniform, fixed solutions. Just as environmental lawyers were
embracing equilibrium ecology, static views of nature were being
replaced by more dynamic ones which made it more difficult to
develop operational rules apart from specific ecosystems. The
equilibrium paradigm solved the critical legitimacy problem for
the development of a new branch of law. The equilibrium para-
digm has been rejected in ecology, a trend that goes back to the
1930s, 69 and replaced with a complex, stochastic, non-equilibrium
one. In his path-breaking but still under-appreciated book, Dis-
CORDANT HARMONIES, Professor Daniel Botkin "deconstructed" the
equilibrium paradigm as a misguided effort to match science to
theological and enlightened scientific visions of a perfect universe
or a perfectly functioning machine. His basic argument is that the
images of nature, which have influenced ecology, are static when
in fact the kinds of resource-use problems society faces require a
67. See Drury, supra n. 20 at 184-185 (1998).
68. The leading proponent of this idea is Eric Katz. See The Problem of Ecological
Restoration, 18 ENVTL. ETHICS 18 (1996) and NATURE AS SUBJECT: HUMAN OBLIGATION
AND NATURAL COMMUNITY (1997). The argument that the distinction is supportable is
effectively refuted in Yuek-Sze Lo, Natural and Artifactual: Restored Nature As Sub-
ject, 21 ENVTL. ETHICS 247 (1999). See also ROBERT ELLIOT, FAKING NATURE: THE ETH-
ICS OF ENVIRONMENTAL RESTORATION (1997).
69. Lawyers will find Judy L. Meyer, Changing Concepts of System Management,
in SUSTAINING OUR WATER RESOURCES 78 (Water Science and Technology Board ed.
1993) and Judy L. Meyer, The Dance of Nature: New Concepts in Ecology, 69 CHI.
KENT L. REV. 875 (1994), a good introduction to modern ecology and its influence on
environmental management. The changes build on the substitution of a non-equilib-
rium for an equilibrium paradigm in ecology. See generally Fred Bosselman and A.
Dan Tarlock, The Influence of Ecological Science on American Law: An Introduction,
69 CHI.-KNT L. REV. 847 (1994).
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dynamic view of nature. Moreover, it is one that starts from the
premises that human action is a principal force operating upon
ecosystems and that system disturbances are both predictable and
random. Ecosystems are patches or collections of conditions that
exist for finite periods of time. The accelerating interaction be-
tween humans and the natural environment makes it impossible
to return to an ideal state of nature. "[Nature moves and changes
and involves risks and uncertainties and ... our own judgments of
our actions must be made against this moving target."70
Botkin's theories have profound ramifications for environ-
mental law. The non-equilibrium paradigm undermines the pro-
ject to construct a system of neo-Kantian environmental ethics
around Aldo Leopold's dictum that "[a] thing is right when it tends
to preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic com-
munity. It is wrong when it tends otherwise."71 The non-equilib-
rium paradigm makes it difficult to sustain the existing ethically-
based justifications for environmental law because the paradigm
focuses attention on the primacy of science as the basis for en-
vironmentalism and environmental law. As Stephen Budiansky
has written, "The idea of risky nature is one that is hard for many
people to swallow. Environmentalists recoil at the notion precisely
because it seems to give man license to transform nature at
will."72 At best, ecosystems can be managed rather than restored
or preserved, and management will be a series of calculated risky
experiments. The New York Court of Appeals recognized this in
1917 when it held that the state could reintroduce beavers be-
cause "governments have made such experiments in the belief
that the public good would be promoted."73
C. The New Problem of Discretion
The search for alternative management processes and
changes in ecology revive the old problem of rules versus adminis-
trative discretion, which environmental litigation and law have
both dismissed and exalted. Environmental law can be seen as an-
other chapter in the central dilemma for the modern administra-
70. DANIEL BOTKIN, DISCORDANT HARMONIES: A NEW ECOLOGY FOR THE TWENTY-
FIRST CENTURY (1990).
71. See J. Baird Callicott, Do Deconstructive Ecology and Sociobiology Undermine
Leopold's Land Ethic? 18 ENVTL. ETHICS 353 (1996) directly confronts this argument
and argues that Leopold is still right but this static principle "must be dynamized."
72. NATURE'S KEEPERS, THE NEW SCIENCE OF NATURE MANAGEMENT 98 (1995).
73. Barrett v. State, 220 N.Y. 423, 116 N.E.99 (1917).
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tive state, that is, whether the exercise of delegated discretion
complies with the rule of law. It can also be seen as an effort to
replace the administrative state with other governance mecha-
nisms. Environmentalism has both exalted democracy and has
had an uneasy relationship with democratic governance. The
New Deal capped the movement that began in the 1880s to govern
American economic life through expert administrative agencies.
The aim of New Deal administrative law was to expand the lawful
exercise of discretion and to confine judicial review to the correc-
tion of procedural irregularities and clear exercises of ultra vires
authority. It only partially succeeded because the 1946 Adminis-
trative Procedure Act (APA) codified the constitutional limitations
imposed on agency procedures and retained the Cokian-Marshal-
lian idea of judicial scrutiny of administrative action.
Environmentalism is one of the first major post-New Deal so-
cial movements. It carried forward the New Deal tradition of def-
erence to expertise and exposed the myth that expert
administration could avoid the value conflicts inherent in all re-
source-use choices. Environmentalism entered the political arena
at the height of the post-New Deal administrative state, but
Rachael Carson's Silent Spring and the growing concern over the
dangers of nuclear weapons testing and power generation were
undermining the fundamental premise of that state: a boundless
faith in technological progress coordinated by experts. It is not
surprising then that the idea of discretion exercised by experts
subject to judicial review for extraordinary deviations from statu-
tory authority, which is the heart of conservation-liberal compro-
mise in the APA, bedeviled environmental NGOs in the 1960's. 74
One of environmental law's many ironies is Citizens to Preserve
Overton Park v. Volpe,75 which opened informal administrative ac-
tion to a "hard look" judicial review. Overton Park revived the
Cokian idea of judicial restraint on the powerful state, which New
Dealers argued was no longer necessary, 76 at a time when such a
state was necessary for environmental protection.
74. Judge Richard J. Posner concisely explains why Post-World War II Americans
accepted with relatively little criticism the work of administrative agencies. See Rich-
ard J. Posner, The Rise and Fall of Administrative Law, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 953
(1997).
75. 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
76. See e.g., JOHN DICKINSON, Administrative Justice and the Supremacy of Law
in the United States, in HARVARD STUDIES iN ADMINISTRATIVE LAw, Vol. 2 (Harvard
Univ. Press 1927).
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Environmental NGOs had to attack the very idea of expert
discretion because the resource management agencies promoted
endless environmental disruption and degradation. They also
used their broad conservation and multi-use mandates to ignore
or marginalize environmental values. The political principle that
they used to attack it was democratic governance. Environmental-
ism grew out of the genuine grass roots nature of the movement
and the ability of the movement to borrow the energy and support
of the anti-war movement that had reached its peak and was de-
clining. Democratic principles enabled the movement to argue (1)
that participation in agency decision-making should be expanded
and (2) that decisions were not technical but "popular" ones. 77
Rather, they were value choices that were not informed by exper-
tise and thus appropriate for lay judicial rather than "expert" ad-
ministrative resolution. This legacy is exemplified in the strong
opposition to remove decisions based on scientific uncertainty to
an expert body such as a science court. Modern risk assessment
and management is often characterized as a pseudo-scientific
screen to disguise the true value choices at stake in a decision to
limit the use and discharge of harmful substances. However, the
Frankfurter-Brandeis view that limited judicial activism is neces-
sary to preserve majority governance is once again in the
ascendancy. 78
The evolution of environmental law makes all levels of discre-
tion, application and enforcement, even more important than they
have been. Environmental protection needs to be carried out on
larger landscape scales, but the ability of rules to structure this
process, other than to provide the necessary legal framework, is
diminishing. We can set objectives, even performance targets, but
we can never be sure that the objectives will be achieved. This
means that environmental protection is increasingly an exercise
in risk sharing rather than the strict enforcement of statutory
mandates. In legal terms, discretion must be exercised for long
77. For a full articulation of this theory see Thomas W. Merrill, Capture Theory
and the Courts: 1967-1983, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1039, 1043 (1997), argues that judi-
cial assertiveness between 1967-1983 "can be explained by judicial disenchantment
with the idea of policymaking by expert and nonpolitical elites."
78. See Richard J. Pierce, Is Standing Law or Politics? 77 N.C. L. REV. 1767-1773
(1999); Judicial Review of Agency Action in a Period of Diminishing Agency Resources,
49 ADMIN. L. REV. 61 (1997); and The Due Process Counterrevolution of the 1990s, 96
COLUM. L. REV. 1973 (1996). For an argument that agency discretion subject to open-
ended legislative standards is consistent with the rule of law, see Thomas 0. Sargen-
tich, The Critique of Active Judicial Review of Administrative Agencies: A Reevalua-
tion, 49 ADMIN. L. REV. 599 (1997).
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periods of time and thus it becomes more difficult to determine
when an action is arbitrary. Additionally, in consensual, decen-
tralized processes, participants must adapt statutory mandates
that were not written with the addressed problem in mind, so a
"rule of law" suit to declare an action ultra vires may be counter-
productive. Often, the best that we can do is to apply adaptive
management to ecosystem management. Adaptive management,
in contrast to the idea of a singular application of a fixed rule to
resolve a dispute, is premised on the assumption that manage-
ment strategies should change in response to new scientific infor-
mation. A recent National Research Council-National Academy of
Sciences study captures the essence of adaptive management:
Adaptive planning and management involve a decision-
making process based on trial, monitoring, and feedback.
Rather than developing a fixed goal and an inflexible plan to
achieve the goal, adaptive management recognizes the imper-
fect knowledge of interdependencies existing within and among
natural and social systems, which requires plans to be modified
as technical knowledge improves .... 79
Students of organizational behavior and computer science
have always counseled the need for feedback loops to reassess pol-
icy as new information accumulates, but this has never been
taken seriously in environmental law and policy. In fact, environ-
mentalists dislike the idea because it suggests that protection
levels may vary over time thereby conflicting with the way that
environmentalists have used law to achieve protection goals. Our
environmental laws accept a scientific premise, factor in a gener-
ous margin of error, and then essentially require its continued ap-
plication regardless of subsequent research findings and thinking.
This attitude cannot persist as we recognize that much environ-
mental management is an experiment and that there may never
be a "final decision."
V. Some Specific Problems of Modern "Rule of Law"
Litigation
The limits of "rule of law" litigation can be seen in recent ef-
forts to discipline innovation, experimental ecosystem of manage-
ment. Much of the biodiversity branch of modern environmental
79. NATIoNAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, RESTORATION OF AQUATIC ECOSYSTEMS 357
(1992).
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law can be characterized as an attempt to practice ecosystem
management. Ecosystem management must deal with three fun-
damental problems presented by the landscape and time scales
that such management presents, and "rule of law" litigation is
only partially suitable to address these issues. The greater, more
complex and ambitious the experiment, the less potential "rule of
law" litigation has to influence its conduct and to promote innova-
tive, effective ecosystem management. Environmental law is at
best a law of process. NEPA and related lawsuits proceed on the
premise that decision-making processes are flawed because of a
failure to consider sufficient information or feasible alternatives.
Students of NEPA and other rational planning processes have
long known that efforts to specify processes have inherent limita-
tions and decay over time as agencies comprehend the formal, ju-
dicial rules of the game and become better players. As
environmental law matures, questions of substance will become
more important. The substance will take the form of specific per-
formance standards as opposed to general rules as H.L.A. Hart
would define them. In fact, environmental law may become a
branch of contracts rather than administrative law.
This said, biodiversity conservation experiments do not neces-
sarily mean the end of rule of law litigation, but in fact will stimu-
late many suits. Many in the environmental community argue
that rule of law suits are more necessary than ever to prevent
these unproven processes from undermining environmental objec-
tives, but it is unlikely that the "classic" suits to stop an activity
dead in its tracks or to delay for as long as possible will be as
important and effective over time. The legal system must ulti-
mately deal with the inherent uncertainties and risks of failure in
ecosystem management plans. For example, ripeness may become
a greater barrier to future litigation because it will be more diffi-
cult to identify the effective point on a continuum for judicial
intervention.80
The creation of a multi-species reserve in Orange County,
California illustrates how the risks and uncertainties inherent in
these experiments make rule of law litigation more problematic.
Since 1991, federal, state, and local governments, private land-
owners, and other stakeholders have cooperated to create a multi-
species habitat reserve to preserve a remnant of the coastal sage
80. See, e.g., Ohio Forestry Ass'n v. Sierra Club, 523 U.S. 726 (1998)(immediate
judicial review of forest management plan not ripe, in part, because review would
prevent agency refinement of its policies).
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scrub ecosystem in southern California. The potential listing of a
small song bird, the California Gnat Catcher under the Endan-
gered Species Act (ESA) precipitated the process, and in 1996, a
public-private reserve was created to protect the bird, remnants
of the coastal sage ecosystem and to allow development consistent
with the species' survival.81 It will be decades, if ever, before we
will know whether the reserve will fulfill its intended purpose. For
example, developers and scientists are still contesting the bird
count upon which development permissions depend.8 2 For this
and other reasons, environmentalists remain uneasy with the
public-private reserve that was created. "Rule of law" litigation
was recently used to try and force the federal government to do
more to save the California Gnat Catcher.
The successful litigation is a case of winning the battle but
not the war, and it arguably did little to expand protection of the
species or to promote multi-species protection. The federal govern-
ment ultimately listed the Gnatcatcher by an ESA § 4(d) special
rule as threatened rather than endangered to enable it to rely on
state-private cooperation to create a reserve. Thus, the U.S. De-
partment of the Interior's Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) did not
designate its critical habitat because identification of its habitat
might precipitate quick clearing to eliminate the threat to devel-
opment. The ESA gives the FWS considerable discretion not to list
habitat when designation would actually jeopardize the continued
existence of the species.8 3 An environmental NGO successfully
challenged the failure of the FWS to designate critical habitat for
81. See, e.g., Marc Ebbin, Is the Southern California Approach to Conservation
Succeeding? 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 695 (1998); STEPHANIE S. PINCERTL, TRANSFORMING
CALIFORNIA: A POLITIcAL HISTORY OF LAND USE AND DEVELOPMENT 279-286 (1999).
82. In 1999, the U.S. Department of the Interior's Fish and Wildlife Service
(FWS) estimated that there were 4,966 pairs and this allowed some habitat to be
cleared, but the count was disputed by a San Bernadino County Museum biologist.
THE SAN DIEGO UNION AND TRIBUNE, May 15, 1999 at A-3.
83. Early cases challenging the failure to designate habitat held that the failure
to designate would not be an abuse of discretion. Some courts have accepted as a
justification for the Secretary's refusal to designate critical habitat the likelihood that
designation will encourage species destruction. See, e.g., Fund for Animals v. Babbitt,
903 F.Supp. 96 (D.D.C. 1995), amended, 967 F.Supp. 6 (D.D.C. 1997). But recent
cases suggest that it will be difficult to justify a refusal to designate. See e.g., Forest
Guardians v. Babbitt, 1998 WL 889368 (10th Cir., Dec. 22, 1998); Building Ind. Ass'n
v. Babbitt, 979 F.Supp. 893 (D.D.C. 1997). Non-designation does not excuse non-com-
pliance with the Act. Jeopardy can still be found if there is no designation, United
States v. Glenn Colusa Irrigation Dist., 788 F.Supp. 1126 (E.D. Cal. 1992). However,
the failure to designate makes it somewhat easier to find no jeopardy. Pyramid Lake
Paiute Tribe v. U.S. Dep't of the Navy, 898 F.2d 1410 (9th Cir. 1990); Enos v. Marsh,
769 F.2d 1363 (9th Cir. 1985).
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the coastal California gnatcatcher in part because the FWS's al-
leged increased threat "fails to balance the pros and cons of desig-
nation as Congress expressly required under section 4 of the Act
.. The listing did not explain how such evidence shows that des-
ignation would cause more landowners to destroy, rather than
protect, gnatcatcher sites."8 4 The victory was a essentially a sym-
bolic one because on remand the FWS limited the designation of
critical habitat to federal lands and non-federal lands with a
nexus. Moreover, the Agency refused to designate the NCCP re-
serve lands, deemed critical to the survival of the species, because
the designation of those lands would not benefit the species.8 5 The
litigation did not derail or modify a very creative example of biore-
gionalism at work but it also did not advance ecosystem
protection.
More generally, tension between "rule of law" litigation and
the need to create incentives for private and public stakeholder
participation in management processes manifests itself in the de-
bate over the allocation of the responsibilities for changed condi-
tions and management failures. Private parties must forego the
enjoyment of their full development entitlements in return for
public approval of ecosystem management plans as consistent
with environmental protection and related mandates. To en-
courage this, acceptable ways must be found to limit the risk expo-
sure of the participants over time. The federal government, and
ultimately NGOs, must walk a thin line between offering less
than full enforcement of a statute as an incentive for a superior
solution 86 and maintaining a credible threat of a more drastic al-
ternative to cooperation. Otherwise, landscape-scale experiments
will not go forward and biodiversity protection will not work.
Many environmental NGOs object to this characterization of
these new processes which hide the fact that the "deals" which
have been struck displace hard-fought for federal standards that
push all the hard management and effectiveness questions to the
future thereby shifting the responsibility for all risks to the fed-
84. NRDC v. United States Dep't of Interior, 113 F.3d 1121 (9th Cir. 1997).
85. See 64 Fed. Reg. 5967, February 8, 1999.
86. In his pioneering exploration of under-enforcement of environment law,
Daniel Farber concludes that under-enforcement both has the potential to encourage
innovation but "also has an inevitable cost in terms of damage to our concept of rule of
law." Taking Slippage Seriously: Noncompliance and Creative Compliance With Envi-
ronmental Law, 23 HARv. ENVTL. L. REV. 297, 325 (1999). See generally DANIEL FAR-
BER, ECO-PRAGMATISM: MAKING SENSIBLE ENVIRONMENTAL DECISIONS IN AN
UNCERTAIN WORLD (1999).
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eral government. The price for participation is often immunity
from responsibility of future, changed conditions. The Department
of Interior responded to this concern by issuing, after NGO pro-
test, its "no surprises" rule. The rule effectively shifts the respon-
sibility for future protection measures to the federal government
once a Habitat Conservation Plan is approved.
These solutions present a rich target of opportunity for "rule
of law" litigation because deals raise both ultra vires and constitu-
tional issues. The case against these deals is that natural re-
sources management is not in fact place-driven; it is centralized.
The great conservation battles of this century have been fought to
eliminate or minimize place-based, that is local and low, stan-
dards by subjecting them to the discipline of national scientific
standards, and this lesson was carried forward into environmen-
tal protection legislation. Congress could, of course, authorize
agencies to adopt placed-based solutions as the national standard,
but environmentalists remain profoundly skeptical of doing so.
The most notable effort to base a resource conservation program
on place-based standards, the Taylor Grazing Act, has been a dis-
aster for watersheds. Thus, state and federal agencies generally
lack the authority accorded to national agencies to adopt local or
placed-based solutions. The more likely scenario, as illustrated by
the California Bay Delta "process" is not complete retro-devolution
but experiments with the user-based stakeholder groups, prodded
by substantial federal and state involvement, 7 to develop accept-
able ecosystem management solutions to achieve the objectives of
federal environmental programs.
The most successful ultra vires challenge to deal-making is
Oregon Natural Resources Council v. Daley,8s but the lesson of the
case is unclear. Along the Pacific Coast, the populations of evolu-
tionary significant units of coastal Coho salmon have been declin-
ing due to a variety of anthropogenic and natural causes. The
anthropogenic causes include timber harvest practices, livestock
grazing, and water diversions. The decision whether to list the
Coho as a threatened species under the ESA has been a political
football throughout the 1990s because protection and restoration
require intensive public and private land use and water manage-
ment. There is no quick technological fix, and the reserve strategy
87. See Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State, 45
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1 (1997).
88. Oregon Natural Resources Council v. Daley, 6 F.Supp.2d 1139 (D. Ore. 1998),
stay denied, 16 F.Supp. 1256.
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applied to terrestrial fauna is inapplicable. In 1997, the National
Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) withdrew an earlier proposal to
list Coho units in Oregon. The Agency decided not to list it as
threatened because the Oregon Coastal Salmon Restoration Initi-
ative, which supplemented the Northwest Forest Management
Plan adopted in 1994 to save the Spotted Owl, would reverse the
population decline. California units were, however, listed because
the state apparently made a calculated political decision not to
formulate a similar initiative. Scientific opinion within NMFS was
divided on the effectiveness of the initiative and on the need to list
the species.
A Magistrate Judge invalidated the decision not to list be-
cause NMFS applied the wrong ESA standard. A species must be
listed if it is likely to become extinct in the foreseeable future, but
the NMFS only evaluated the effect of the Initiative on population
declines over a two year period. The primary flaw in NMFS's ap-
proach was to base its decision not on science but on faith on fu-
ture actions taken by the legislative and executive branches of
Oregon. "NMFS ... was unwilling to make the hard choice re-
quired by the ESA. .. ." Oregon's initiative relied in part on wa-
tershed councils where landowner participation was "largely
voluntary," and NMFS had rejected California's action plan, in
part, because the state had not funded a paper watershed initia-
tive and landowner participation was voluntary. This led to the
conclusion that reliance on the state's initiative was arbitrary and
capricious because it relied on unimplemented, largely voluntary
future actions.8 9 The Court found the agency's failure to explain
why Oregon's initiative did not pose the same risks as California's
pseudo-plan "telling."90 "However laudable Oregon's efforts to em-
ploy new management techniques to try to restore the Oregon
Coast ESU, such future voluntary conservation effort cannot be a
substitute for listing."91 The case is a hard one and can be inter-
preted as a laudable effort by a court to expose a pseudo-protec-
89. A series of previous district court opinions held that the FWS could not rely on
possible future management actions by other agencies. See Biodiversity Legal Foun-
dation v. Babbitt, 943 F.Supp. 23 (D.D.C. 1996); Friends of the Wild Swan, 945
F.Supp. 1388 (D. Or. 1996). The Ninth Circuit held that the FWS could not excuse its
duty to designate critical habitat for the California Gnatcatcher on an elaborate re-
serve system created under a voluntary state program. Natural Resources Defense
Council v. U.S. Department of Interior, 113 F.3d 1121 (9th Cir. 1997).
90. Oregon Natural Resources Council v. Daley, 6 F.Supp.2d 1139, 1159 (D. Ore.
1998).
91. Id.
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tion plan, but, as I develop below, the case can also be interpreted
as a premature intervention in a risky but promising management
strategy.
The joint efforts of the Sierra Club, the National Audubon So-
ciety, the Idaho Farm Bureau and the Mountain States Legal
Foundation to block the reintroduction of wolves into all of Idaho
south of Interstate 90 is a clearer example of the limitations of
"rule of law" judicial invalidation of a large-scale experiment. Liti-
gation protected phantom, rather than real, wolves. Changed soci-
etal perceptions of the wolf and better scientific understanding of
their behavior led to efforts to reintroduce the species in Minne-
sota and Northern Rockies 92 after they had been almost extir-
pated from the United States.93 Reintroduction is controversial
among ranchers because of livestock losses 94 and among some na-
tional environmental NGOs 95 because it may put the wolves
which have naturally reestablished themselves in the Northern
Rockies at risk. The ultimate scientific issue is how many wolves
naturally exist in Idaho and the extent of likely contact and in-
breeding between the two groups.
The Northern Rocky Mountain Wolf Recovery Team defined a
viable wolf population, or pack, as two breeding pairs.96 There
were many reported wolf sightings in Idaho, but two breeding
pairs could not be located by the FWS. Thus, the Service con-
cluded that a reintroduction plan was necessary to produce three
breeding pairs in three targeted areas because no population ex-
92. See Thomas McNamee, THE RETURN OF THE WOLF TO YELLOWSTONE (1997).
93. See e.g., David L. Mech, THE WOLF: ECOLOGY AND BEHAVIOR OF AN ENDAN-
GERED SPECIES (1970); Rick McIntyre, A SOCIETY OF WOLVES: NATIONAL PARKS AND
THE BATTLE OVER THE WOLF (1993). For a history of the recovery program see
Timothy B. Strauch, The Wolf By The Ears: The Conseration of the Northern Moun-
tain Wolf in Yellowstone National Park, 27 LAND & WATER L. REV. 33 (1992).
94. The actual documented livestock kills by wolves are relatively rare and there
are private and public sources of compensation, although there may be no duty on the
part of the federal government to compensate. Mountain States Legal Foundation v.
Hodel, 799 F.2d 1423 (10th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 951 (1987), but the losses
are concentrated and deeply felt. See Brian N. Beisher, Are Ranchers Legitimately
Trying to Save Their Hides Or Are They Just Crying Wolf-What Must Be Resolved
Before Wolf Reintroduction To Yellowstone National Park Proceeds?, 29 LAND &
WATER L. REV. 417 (1993). Holly Doremus, Restoring Endangered Species: The Im-
portance of Being Wild, 23 HARv. ENVTL. L. REV. 1 (1999) presents a case for no
compensation.
95. The National Wildlife Federation and the Defenders of Wildlife intervened in
Wyoming Farm Bureau Federation v. Babbitt to support the recovery plan.
96. Final Environmental Impact Statement, THE REINTRODUCTION OF GRAY
WOLVES To YELLOWSTONE NATIONAL PARK AND CENTRAL IDAHO 2-5 (1994).
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isted in Idaho.97 Taking advantage of the flexibility introduced
into the ESA, the FWS classified both the pre-1994 "natural"
wolves in Idaho as well as the proposed reintroduced Canadian
gray wolves as a nonessential experimental population.98 The
wolves were classified as threatened rather than endangered spe-
cies, and therefore could be killed by private landowners if they
were caught killing domestic livestock. The Sierra Club and the
National Audubon Society attacked the decision as withdrawal of
pre-existing protection from the "natural" wolves. The substantive
issue was whether ESA Section 10(j), which limits experimental
populations to those which are separate from geographically iso-
lated populations, was violated.
The district court deferred to DOI's conclusion that there was
no known population but held that DOI violated the wholly geo-
graphically separate requirement because the DOI administrative
record contained statements that members of the natural wolf
population existed in the experimental area. 99 The statute re-
quires reasonably predictable separation by fixed migration pat-
terns or natural or man-made barriers. Audubon argued that the
reintroduction was a de facto delisting of naturally occurring
wolves. The real issue is the level of risk that the experiment en-
tails and the required confidence level. In this case, the district
court appeared to reject a sound scientific experiment with no off-
setting benefit to either the environment or the idea of rule of law.
Almost three years later, the Tenth Circuit reversed and held
that the Endangered Species Act does not require that "experi-
mental and natural populations be forever kept distinct" because
such an inflexible reading would undermine all reintroduction
programs. 100 However, the immediate damage had been done; a
promising ecosystem restoration experiment which in the Tenth
Circuit's words addressed "biological reality," had been derailed
by "rule of law" litigation.
VI. Conclusion
The conduct of large-scale landscape management experi-
ments does not eliminate the need for the fundamental objective
97. 59 Fed. Reg. 60252, 60254, November 22, 1994.
98. 16 U.S.C. § 1539(j).
99. See Note, A Native Returns: The Endangered Species Act and Wolf Rein-
troduction to the Northern Rocky Mountains, 20 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 329, 355-359
(1995).
100. Wyoming Farm Bureau Federation v. Babbitt, 199 F.3d 1224 (10th Cir. 2000).
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of "rule of law" litigation or agency accountability, but the impor-
tance of such litigation will decline over time. It is not hard to
craft "rules" to invalidate decisions to defer the listing of candi-
date species. For example, courts have held that the FWS may not
rely on future actions contemplated by a conservation agreement
to deny a listing or downgrade the priority of the species if the
species otherwise warrants protection.10 ' Accountability will ulti-
mately come more from factors internal to the process. The funda-
mental flaw of the district court cases such as Natural Resources
Defense Council v. Daley and Wyoming Farm Bureau Federation is
that the interpretation of the ESA adopted by the courts demands
a level of initial certainty that is incompatible with the idea of an
experiment. The courts cut off the experiment too early. It is un-
realistic to demand in advance that the experimental process
work. An approach that would reconcile possible new directions in
environmental law with the rule of law, would be to focus on how
to hold the systems managers accountable over the time horizon of
the experiment.
Specifically, I suggest three inquiries that courts should
make. First, a court should borrow the concept of scientific
method applied in Daubert to ask if the experiment as constructed
is consistent with the relevant scientific opinion. Essentially, the
court must attempt to distinguish between good faith and sham or
politically tainted experiments; obviously only the former should
be allowed to go forward. The second inquiry asks if the responsi-
ble federal agencies are actively involved in the process. If so,
there should be a presumption that accountability exists. If not,
judicial intervention may be appropriate. Accountability problems
arise when the government has struck a distorted balance be-
tween accountability with private participation incentives. For ex-
ample, habitat conservation banks pose such a risk. The state of
California created a habitat bank in western Riverside county in
California. Developers could buy credits from a conservation bank
and thus destroy the habitats of threatened species where they
want to build. To encourage participation, the state exempted the
individual participating projects from review for 50 years. A Cali-
fornia intermediate appellate court ruled that the complexity and
uncertainties of the plan required a full environmental impact
statement (EIS), as mandated in NEPA, because it was not clear
101. See e.g. Save Our Springs v. Babbitt, 27 F.Supp.2d 739 (W.D. Tex. 1997);
Friends of the Wild Swan v. United States Fish & Game Service, 945 F.Supp. 1388 (D.
Ore. 1996).
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that the species would in fact be adequately protected and also
because there was a need for public comment regarding the
project.10 2
The third inquiry should be into the democratic nature of the
process. NGOs face a participation dilemma with implications for
rule of law litigation. If NGOs fail to participate, they may be able
to bring rule of law challenges but they lack the ability to influ-
ence the process and the record. If they do participate (or decline
an invitation to participate) in multi-stakeholder processes that
produce an environmentally defensible solution, a court may in-
voke estoppel principles to let the solution stand. The case uphold-
ing a multi-stakeholder process that led to a 90% reduction in S02
emissions at the Navajo Generating Station to improve regional
visibility at the Grand Canyon National Park is instructive. The
court rejected a stakeholder utility challenge to the EPA's visibil-
ity rule, in part, because the process affords "no reason for this
court disruptively to interject itself into the picture."'10 3
My positive conclusion is that the evolution of environmental
law suggests that the rule of law litigation strategy will be less
effective in the future because lawsuits will play a less important
role as environmental protection enters its second generation.
Changes in ecology have undermined the simple faith that
preventing changes in natural systems is a sufficient protection
strategy, the search for non-litigation alternatives, especially
stakeholder consensus processes, to resolve environmental dis-
putes is accelerating.
My heretical, normative conclusion is that if environmental
protection is to succeed as a legitimate, permanent policy perspec-
tive, it must evolve from a negative strategy of trying to stop an
action that disturbs a mythical natural baseline to a pervasive,
affirmative one which provides incentives for creative super-legal
protection solutions that are sometimes "extra" legal. The changed
role of "rule of law" litigation will more directly affect the growing
efforts to conserve biodiversity than the enforcement of command
and control air, water and soil pollution and risk assessment and
management programs, but these programs may also be affected,
especially where there is a close link to biodiversity conservation.
The need for NGO vigilance and litigation will always exist, but
102. See San Bernadino Audubon Society v. Metropolitan Water District, 71
Cal.Rptr. 4th 382 (Cal.App. 4th Dist. 1999).
103. Central Arizona Water Conservation Dist. v. Environmental Protection
Agency, 990 F.2d 1531 (9th Cir. 1993).
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the changed role represents a needed correction of initial regula-
tory strategies. It reflects our understanding of the complex na-
ture of environmental systems and their management. As
environmental law matures, questions of substance will become
more important, but the substance will take the form of specific
performance standards as opposed to general rules as H.L.A. Hart
would define them. Environmental law may become a branch of
the law of contracts rather a law of rules.
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